In corporate operations, the majority rule is the guiding principle for ensuring effective collective decision-making. However, this rule can sometimes be diverted from its primary purpose, leading to what legal doctrine and case law have long termed “abuse of majority” (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 18 April 1961, No. 59-11.394).

This legal mechanism has become a fundamental element in protecting minority shareholders against the potential excesses of majority power.

This article dives into the heart of this imbalance, between legitimate power and overreach, to understand how the law regulates these abuses and how to challenge them.

1. Definition of abuse of majority

Abuse of majority is rooted in the violation of Article 1833 of the Civil Code, which states that a company must be formed in the common interest of the shareholders and managed in its corporate interest.

As case law consistently reiterates, two cumulative criteria must be met to establish an abuse of majority (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 24 January 1995, No. 93-13.273):

1. A decision contrary to the company’s interest;

2. An intention to favour the majority shareholders to the detriment of the minority shareholders.

Simply “losing a vote” is not enough to constitute abuse: the decision must cross that often blurry line between legitimate majority strategy and the misappropriation of collective interest.

What about unanimity?

According to the Court of Cassation, a unanimous decision by shareholders cannot constitute an abuse of majority (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 8 November 2023, No. 22-13.851). This assertion, while categorical in tone but minimalist in its reasoning, raises numerous questions.

2. Examples: the many faces of abuse of majority

Abuse of majority does not have a single look. It disguises itself as a strategic decision, a management choice, or a technical manoeuvre. But behind these appearances lies a single intention: to favour the majority at the expense of the minority, without any justification related to the corporate interest.

A few examples:

Misappropriation of value: capturing to better deprive

Majority shareholders may use their power to direct the company’s wealth toward their exclusive benefit, in disregard of internal balances:

  • Unjustified refusal to distribute dividends: even while they compensate themselves through other channels (salaries, various benefits), majority shareholders systematically oppose the distribution of dividends. Minority shareholders, meanwhile, are entitled to nothing.
    This only constitutes abuse if the directors’ compensation is unjustified or if the systematic allocation to reserves is contrary to the company’s interests (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 6 June 1990, No. 88-19.420; Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 30 August 2023, No. 22-10.108; Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 10 June 2020, No. 18-15.614).
  • Massive salary increases: majority shareholder-managers vote for a salary hike of over 250%, causing net income to collapse and ending dividend distributions. The Court of Cassation overturned a ruling that had dismissed the abuse of majority without providing justification (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 15 January 2020, No. 18-11.580).
  • Unequal distribution of profits: the majority decides to break the equality in profit sharing in order to oust a minority shareholder (Court of Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 19 May 2021, No. 18-18.896).

Dilution of power: weakening without reason

When the objective of a decision is political rather than economic (to weaken a minority shareholder), the law refers to this as abusive dilution.

An abuse of majority power is constituted by an assembly’s decision to increase capital just before the sale of a significant asset for the sole purpose of diluting a minority shareholder’s stake (Court of Cassation, 3rd Civil Chamber, 8 July 2015, No. 13-14.348).

Strategic sabotage: hollowing out to rule

Some abuses are more sophisticated: they aim to modify the company’s structure or organisation to exclude any minority oversight:

  • Transformation of the parent company into an “empty shell”: through a capital operation, the majority transfers the subsidiary’s shares to a limited partnership with shares that they control alone. The parent company loses all economic substance, the minority shareholders lose all power, and the abuse is established (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 24 January 1995, No. 93-13.273).
  • Strategic liquidation: without a serious reason, the majority shareholder decides to dissolve the company to escape contractual obligations toward a minority shareholder. Since the decision was made contrary to the company’s interest and with the sole purpose of evading this obligation, the abuse is established, and the majority shareholder is ordered to compensate the minority shareholder for their loss of opportunity (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 8 February 2011, No. 10-11.788).
  • Fire-sale disposal: majority shareholders vote to sell an asset below market price to a structure they own exclusively. The abuse is clear: the Court imposes sanctions (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 24 May 2016, No. 14-28.121).

Conflict of interest: the company at the service of one person

Sometimes, the company is used as a personal tool to secure transactions that serve only the interests of one shareholder.

This is the case with mortgage guarantees for personal loans: the company pledges its property as collateral for a loan granted to a shareholder without receiving any benefit. When this property is its only asset, the security puts its very existence at risk: it is contrary to the company’s interest and therefore void, even if it falls within the scope of the articles of association and even if it was voted on unanimously (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 23 September 2014, No. 13-17.347).

We are moving beyond abuse of majority in the strict sense here: being contrary to the company’s interest is sufficient, without the need to establish an intent to favour the majority shareholders. However, the concept is similar, and this legal basis takes over where unanimity closes the door to an abuse claim.

3. Sanctions

The recognition of an abuse of majority can lead to two types of sanctions:

a. Annulment of the decision

This is the primary sanction. The judge may simply annul the resolution that was abusively adopted during a meeting.

You must act in time. As of 1 October 2025, the statute of limitations for an action for nullity is two years from the day the nullity is incurred, compared to three years previously (Art. 1844-14 of the Civil Code, as amended by Ordinance No. 2025-229 of 12 March 2025). For prior decisions, the new two-year period runs from 1 October 2025.

b. Damages

If annulment is not sufficient to compensate for the loss (loss of dividends, devaluation of shares, etc.), minority shareholders may also seek compensation based on civil liability.

A liability claim seeking damages is subject to a 5-year statute of limitations (Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 30 May 2018, No. 16-21.022).

Are you a minority shareholder suspecting abusive conduct?

Every case is unique, but the law provides avenues for action. Contact me to discuss it!

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